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The Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions 
Constitutions take various forms in different societies, but essentially determine how policy
issues, often of fundamental social importance, are to be decided and implemented.
Constitutions and constitutionalism are usually studied either doctrinally, as the source of
fundamental legal doctrine, or conceptually, as the subject of philosophical methods of
analysis. The approach of this programme offers a third way: the study of constitutions and
constitutionalism in their social context, emphasizing their social character and role, their
social goals, and their links to other parts of society, especially economic and political
aspects.
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n In recent years, several Muslim-majority countries have reconsidered the constitutional
status of Islamic law: Afghanistan, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, to name a few. This trend is likely
to continue. 
n In Muslim-majority states, the different ways in which constitutions wrestle with the
combination of Islamic law and parliamentary power remains rather poorly understood.
Some see Islamic law as inflexible. However, anthropologists, political scientists, and
legal scholars have gone out of their way to illuminate the ways in which it is also
historically flexible.
n In Muslim-majority states, different political parties often have different perspectives on
this issue: Islamists often stress the fixity of Islamic law; secularists either ignore Islamic
law or stress its flexibility. 
n Grounded in the shifting terrain of electoral politics, the cut and thrust of parliamentary
practice generally favours flexibility. However, this push towards flexibility often leads
countervailing executive and/or judicial actors to argue that the terms of shari‘ah might
be used to limit the domain of popular sovereignty. These actors often refer to shari‘ah
as a type of supra-constitutional meta-structure standing outside and above the realm
of legislative politics. 
n In many Muslim-majority states the question is not whether the terms of shari‘ah
suggest a set of overarching legal norms. The question is how those norms might be
illuminated and, thus, which actors/institutions are in a position to control their
selection and interpretation. In this context, overarching constitutional questions
regarding the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers figure
prominently. 
n Pakistan has wrestled with the constitutional relationship between Islamic law and
parliamentary power for nearly seventy years, developing some of the most
sophisticated thinking on these issues. A deeper understanding of competing
constitutional approaches to the relationship between Islamic law and parliamentary
power in Pakistan sheds a great deal of light on the relationship between Islam and
democracy more generally. 
Executive Summary
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Islamic law and state power: The issue
On 5 May 2015 an article appeared in Pakistan’s
most prominent English-language newspaper,
Dawn, in relation to the Pakistan Supreme Court.
The Court had been hearing a case regarding
constitutional amendments passed by the
National Assembly that address the relationship
between the legislature, the judiciary, and the
executive. At issue was the ability of the legislature
to reframe (via such amendments) the ‘basic
structure’ of the state. ‘What … if, by popular
demand, … [legislators press] for changing the
basic structure … to secularism?’ one justice asked.
It would be odd, noted another, if the judiciary
were to strike down constitutional amendments
simply by referring to some theory of supra-
constitutional ‘basic structure’. Indeed, the Chief
Justice explained, such theories (originating in
Germany) were ‘never accepted by the court’. In
Pakistan, the court has always ‘acknowledged the
supremacy of parliament’.1
Throughout the Muslim world, constitutions frame
the terms within which Islamic law is combined
with, or separated from, state power. In recent
years, several Muslim-majority countries have
reconsidered the constitutional status of shari‘ah:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Tunisia, Egypt, to name a few.
This trend is likely to continue; however, the ways
in which constitutions wrestle with the
combination of Islamic law and parliamentary
power is poorly understood. Some see Islamic law
as religiously fixed. However, scholars have gone
out of their way to illuminate the ways in which it
is also historically flexible. The cut and thrust of
parliamentary practice, grounded in the shifting
terrain of electoral politics, generally favours
flexibility. However, this push in the direction of
flexibility occasionally leads executive and judicial
actors to argue that the terms of shari‘ah should be
used to limit the domain of popular sovereignty.
Indeed, executive and judicial actors often reference
shari‘ah as a type of irrefutable basic norm (in Hans
Kelsen’s terms, a legal ‘grundnorm’) standing outside
and above the realm of legislative politics. 
When legislators attempt to redistribute land,
regulate interest charges in the banking sector,
protect heterodox beliefs, abolish the death penalty,
or extend equal inheritance rights to sons and
daughters, references are often made to Qur’anic
verses or injunctions spelled out in digests of
classical Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) in order to
suggest that this or that legislative effort lies ‘outside
the boundaries of Islam’. The effect of such efforts,
however, does not lie in clarifying the historically
flexible boundaries of Islamic law once and for all.
Instead it lies in suggesting that those boundaries
should be defined by actors other than elected
legislators. The question is not whether the terms of
shari‘ah suggest an overarching set of legal norms.
The question is, simply, who should define those
norms—elected legislators or someone else? 
In Pakistan, as in many other countries, a deeper
understanding of competing constitutional
approaches to the relationship between Islam and
democracy requires a more nuanced understanding
of the relationship between Islamic law and
questions of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Islamic law and the state: Why parliamentary
power is important 
Historians, political scientists, and legal scholars
writing about the link between shari‘ah and the state
often focus on different issues. Historians and
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anthropologists tend to focus on what might be
described as alternative ‘spaces’ of shari‘ah: non-state
muftis issuing non-enforceable fatwas, on the one
hand; state-based qazis working with particular
caliphs to enforce a state-based form of ‘siyasa
shari‘ah’, on the other. Dismissing the idea of an
‘immutable’ shari‘ah, these scholars describe the
ways in which shari‘ah as a ‘living law’ has been — or
has not been — historically tied to the state. 
More recently, however, political scientists like Jillian
Schwedler have focused on the conditions under
which efforts to ‘shari‘ah-ify’ the state, on the part of
‘Islamist’ political parties, might unfold in ‘moderate’
ways.2 These scholars often shy away from an account
of different groups competing to define what shari‘ah
itself might mean. Instead, they draw attention to
variables like Islamist party structure and overarching
political conditions, asking whether Islamists seeking
to enforce something broadly called ‘shari‘ah’ will
work with other parties — say, non-religious leftist or
liberal parties — or not. (According to Schwedler,
moderates will, but non-moderates won’t.)
Islamic legal scholars, however, often try to peek
inside the discursive tradition of shari’ah, fleshing out
alternative approaches to issues like the
constitutional separation of powers. Here, one of the
most important questions concerns the relationship
between executive and judicial power: qazis working
for executive caliphs, if you will, versus strictly
judicial muftis issuing non-enforceable fatwas. More
recently, however, greater attention has been paid to
the work of elected Muslim parliaments — not
parliaments constitutionally divorced from the work
of the ulema (as in Turkey) or categorically
subordinated to it (as in Iran), but, as the Chief
Justice of Pakistan pointed out, Muslim parliaments
charged with considering the non-binding advice of
the ulema while remaining fully sovereign. 
Here one might consider the work of legal scholars
like Khalid Abou El Fadl or Mohammed Fadel.3 How
should we think about the role of multi-party Muslim
parliaments with respect to matters of shari’ah? How
is shari’ah tied, not merely to a ‘fixed’ politics of
religious being, but also to a vigorously contested
parliamentary politics of Muslim adaptation or
becoming? This is the issue I examine in what follows,
focusing on the case of Pakistan.
Analysis: Islamic law and parliamentary
power in Pakistan
For nearly seventy years Pakistan has struggled with
the constitutional relationship between its
parliament and shari‘ah. As a state created to
advance the well-being of a particular religious
group, while at the same time grappling with a
deep-rooted legacy of European colonialism,
however, the constitutional history of Islam in
Pakistan differs somewhat from that of many other
Muslim countries: Egypt and Turkey, for instance,
were not created as states defined by religion; Iran
and Afghanistan did not experience the same type of
European colonialism; Indonesia has its own rather
distinctive constitutional vision of pancasila;
Malaysia has its federalization of shari‘ah. Similarly,
many states struggling with the status of shari‘ah
focus on high-profile constitutional clauses —
clauses regarding the status of Islamic law as ‘a’ or
‘the’ source of legislation.4 But, in Pakistan, many of
the most important debates regarding shari‘ah
involved, not the substantive features of shari‘ah, but
rather the separation of powers. 
What the Chief Justice of Pakistan described as
Pakistan’s attachment to ‘the supremacy of
parliament’ was not a foregone conclusion when
Pakistan was formed in 1947; instead it emerged
over several years — including (somewhat ironically)
several years of martial law — in a series of political
battles involving two distinct groups of religious
actors — the modernist Jama’at-e-Islami and the
traditionalist ulema — as well as two groups of
actors that did not self-identify as religious —
namely the military and competing Muslim
nationalists. Since 1947 both the Jama’at and the
ulema have collaborated to oppose what they saw as
an ‘un-Islamic’ military and/or a parliamentary claim
to ‘unfettered’ legislative power in matters of
religion. These actors opposed state-based efforts to
‘rewrite the laws of God’.5 And, yet, some of the most
energetic battles did not concern legal substance;
they unfolded between the military and parliament
in a tussle to define the constitutional separation of
powers. In fact, both Charles Kennedy and Martin
Lau have argued that, in the battle between
Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, appeals to the
judiciary became so prevalent that, ultimately, it was
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neither the executive nor the legislature but the
judiciary that stepped in to define ‘Islam’.6
In what follows, however, I draw a different
conclusion. Agreeing with the Chief Justice
mentioned earlier, I draw on an account of Pakistan’s
constitutional history to show that, in the end, it was
actually Pakistan’s parliament that emerged as
constitutionally supreme. 
Islamic law and parliamentary power in Pakistan
1947–1958
The members of Pakistan’s first Constituent
Assembly began their work with a landmark
resolution known as the Objectives Resolution.7 In
1949, this Resolution set Pakistani constitutionalism
apart from the secular language of India while at the
same time seeking to stitch the provinces of East and
West Pakistan together within the terms of Islam.
This Resolution — construed as a non-binding
constitutional preamble — began as follows: 
Whereas sovereignty over the entire universe
belongs to God almighty … and [whereas] the
authority which He has delegated to the state of
Pakistan through its people … is a sacred trust, …
this Constituent Assembly, representing the people
of Pakistan, resolves to frame a Constitution for the
sovereign independent state of Pakistan; wherein
the state shall exercise its power … through the
chosen representatives of the people; … [and]
Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives … in
accordance with Islam. 
Approved under the prime minister, who migrated
from East Punjab after the partition of India, as well
as Pakistan’s governor-general, hailing from East
Bengal, this resolution sought to balance the
rhetorical priorities associated with specific religious
actors (regarding the sovereignty of ‘Allah’) with the
terms of Muslim nationalism (and, therein, the
sovereignty of the ‘state’). At the same time, however,
this Resolution went out of its way to avoid any
references to classical jurisprudence or fiqh. Instead,
Pakistan’s prime minister proposed that the head of
state should create a strictly advisory Board of Ulema
to rule on the religious ‘repugnancy’ of individual
laws (with a unanimous vote of this Board forcing
any impugned law back to the legislature for
amendment). Eventually, however, even this
accommodation of the ulema was rejected, with the
Constituent Assembly recommending that any
declaration of repugnancy should be made by the
Supreme Court alone.
The marginalization felt by Pakistan’s religious actors
was severe. They deeply resented any push to share
power vis-à-vis the delineation of Islamic law. And,
beginning in 1952, they turned to riots in a rather
cynical bid to reassert their religious authority. In
effect, religious activists encouraged the public to
recognize the authority of particular religious elites in
defining the boundaries of the community, including
the relocation of a heterodox group known as the
Ahmadiyya outside of the community’s walls.8
Several weeks of riots brought about Pakistan’s first
period of martial law. Shortly thereafter, the courts
stepped in to clarify that the vigilantism of self-styled
religious elites was incompatible with public order.
The terms of Islam, they argued, must be defined via
the ongoing task of state-based legislation (drawing
attention to a particular view of constitutional ‘non-
establishment’ focused, not on religious non-
establishment, but rather doctrinal
non-establishment and, thus, stressing the value of
competing Muslim views driving the practice of
ongoing legislation within a broad reading of Islam). 
The chief author of this judgment did not believe
that the boundaries of non-establishment should be
decided by a powerful group of parliamentarians
(particularly insofar as many MPs had shown
themselves to be susceptible to ‘populist fevers’).
Instead, the lead author felt that the clarification of
religious boundaries required the fortification of
Pakistan’s executive. 
In the end, however, fearing the emergence of an
ever-expanding executive, Pakistan’s first
Constituent Assembly reasserted the power of
parliament. First, they sought to create a purely
advisory commission recommending the
Islamization of existing laws (while, at the same time,
protecting the sectarian diversity within ‘Muslim
personal law’ from the homogenizing thrust of this
process). And, then, having done so, they resolved
that any statute deemed religiously repugnant by
Pakistan’s Supreme Court would be referred back to
the legislature for amendment.9
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Before these recommendations were fully enacted,
however, political turmoil led the president to
dismiss Pakistan’s National Assembly, declaring
martial law before, three weeks later, being removed
by his own martial law administrator. Pakistan’s first
Constitution, if you will, imagined a powerful
parliament, but during the mid-1950s real power still
lay with Pakistan’s executive. 
Islamic law and parliamentary power in Pakistan
1958–1977
Even before Pakistan’s new leader, General Ayub
Khan, took up the task of formulating a new
Constitution, however, he promulgated a dramatic
set of reforms to Muslim family law by way of an
executive ordinance, marginalizing the Jama’at and
the ulema in ways that gave the state more power to
define shari‘ah for itself.10 In fact, when Ayub Khan
finally turned to promulgating a new Constitution, he
went out of his way to ensure that his rather
audacious new Family Laws Ordinance was
protected from the burden of judicial review. In
effect, Pakistan’s second Constitution defined the
high watermark of a reformist approach to shari‘ah
led by a powerful executive.11
Ayub began by retaining the 1949 Objectives
Resolution as a non-binding preamble before going
on to ensure that Pakistan’s non-enforceable
Directive Principles of State Policy were diluted to
relax the possibility of any constraints defined by the
Jama’at or the ulema. In particular, he attempted to
ensure that any Islamization programme would
depend on the ability of different schools of religious
thought to arrive at a position of unanimity with
respect to the basic ‘principles’ of Islam — a
requirement that Ayub saw as politically
indispensable precisely insofar as he believed that it
was historically unprecedented.12
These changes, however, were fiercely opposed by
Pakistan’s religious lobby, and within a year, each was
systematically reversed. In particular, the
Constitution was amended to ensure that, in the
course of state-based efforts to avoid any law
deemed repugnant to Islam ‘as set out in the Holy
Qur’an and sunnah’, the expression ‘Qur’an and
sunnah’ would mean ‘the Qur’an and sunnah as
interpreted by each sect’. In other words, the sectarian
divisions that characterized the ulema would still
have a role to play in formal declarations of
‘repugnancy’. Still, Ayub’s Constitution continued to
require that any final decision regarding the
correction of repugnancy would be made, not by the
ulema or the superior judiciary, but rather by the
National Assembly. 
General Ayub was eventually forced to resign. But,
when he did, he did not follow his own
constitutional principle stating that a vacancy in the
presidency would be filled by the Speaker of the
Assembly. Instead, he appointed General Yahya
Khan, who went on to hold national elections during
the winter of 1970 — elections that threw the
country into civil war (leading to the formation of
Bangladesh).
This cataclysmic turn of events prompted wider
efforts to reconstitute the state itself, during which
Pakistan’s new prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto,
introduced a new Constitution preserving almost
every existing article concerning the state’s
relationship with shari‘ah (even to the point of
protecting Muslim personal law — and, thus, at least
ostensibly, Ayub Khan’s controversial Muslim Family
Laws Ordinance — from the burden of judicial
review).13 In fact, with respect to the constitutional
treatment of Islamic law, the dictatorship of Ayub
and the democracy of Bhutto scarcely differed. The
only important difference involved an amendment
unanimously approved by the National Assembly
excommunicating the Ahmadiyya.
Before long, however, Bhutto’s opponents came
together in an avalanche of political resistance. The
elections that followed were rigged in Bhutto’s
favour, and, as protests spread, General Zia-ul-Haq
enforced another coup. 
Islamic law and parliamentary power in Pakistan
1977 to present
General Zia-ul-Haq is well known for his campaign of
‘Islamization’. But, in so many ways, his efforts
involved only slight modifications to all that had
come before. In 1979, for instance, General Zia
introduced a fresh constitutional amendment
modifying earlier efforts to endow the Supreme
Court with the power to identify repugnant laws —
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this time declaring that laws impugned by Pakistan’s
provincial High Courts would be sent, not to the
National Assembly, but rather to Zia (or his provincial
governors) for amendment. In effect, Zia sought to
shift the balance of power away from the legislature
towards the executive. But, within a year, he had
revised his own amendment, disbanding his
‘provincial’ shariat courts to create a new Federal
Shariat Court (FSC) — appointed by the president —
instead. 
Some see this Federal Shariat Court as an ‘apex’ court
concerning matters of Islamic law. But, technically
speaking, it is actually located within Pakistan’s
ordinary judicial hierarchy, with appeals travelling to
a Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court and,
then, a full bench of Pakistan’s highest court. In any
case, Zia followed closely in the footsteps of his
predecessors, ensuring that his Shariat Court would
not be empowered to review the Constitution itself
or any ‘Muslim personal law’ (including, at least
ostensibly, Ayub’s Family Laws).14
Oddly, the FSC appeared reluctant to exercise its
powers. In one case, the Court held that it was not
permitted to judge matters of concern to some
Islamists, like the permissibility of elections, because
these matters were addressed in the Constitution
itself.15 In another, the Court held that it was unable
to address cases of inheritance insofar as these cases
pertained to ‘Muslim personal law’.16 In fact, even
when the Court did exploit its jurisdiction, it
embarrassed Zia. Very early on, for instance, the
Court declared that stoning was no longer seen as
an acceptable punishment for adultery.17 
This decision led Zia to add three additional ulema to
the court, while, at the same time, permitting the
court to revise its decisions.18 Apparently, judicial
autonomy was not Zia’s goal. On the contrary, Zia’s
new Shariat Court was clearly designed as a
handmaiden to Pakistan’s executive.
Even after the FSC was reconstituted to include
additional ulema, however, it continued to challenge
Zia. In one case the Court held that, where there was
no ‘state action’ transforming an element of shari‘a
into a statute, there was actually nothing for the
court to ‘strike down’ or send back to the president
for amendment.19 Like Pakistan’s ordinary Supreme
Court, in other words, the Shariat Court continued to
insist that its role lay in deciding which statutes were
not Islamic. Its role did not lie in deciding what any
statute should say. 
Frustration with the FSC eventually prompted Zia to
amend the Constitution once again. This time, Zia
recast the Objectives Resolution as an entirely new
article within the Constitution itself: Article 2A. In
effect, Zia wanted to provide his courts with the
power to strike down disagreeable elements of the
Constitution in keeping with an overarching
‘grundnorm’.20
Unfortunately, even after the promulgation of Article
2A, Zia found that his own courts were still reluctant
to support his executive-centred approach to
shari’ah. In two key cases, the Supreme Court held
that Article 2A was not a supra-constitutional
provision superseding the power of parliament.21
(And, in one of these cases, it notes that, although
Article 2A could be used to challenge an executive
ordinance, it could not be used to strike down an
ordinary piece of legislation.22) 
Finally, however, more than twenty years after its
creation, the FSC stepped in to strike down a portion
of Ayub Khan’s notorious Family Laws Ordinance.23 In
particular, the Court annulled the executive
ordinance through which a new set of inheritance
rights for orphaned grandchildren had been created.
Even after it highlighted the absence of any
orphaned grandchildren in any known scheme of
Qur’anic heirs, however, the FSC still refused to say
what the terms of inheritance ‘should be’. Instead,
drawing attention to the experience of several other
Muslim-majority countries (Egypt, Morocco, Syria,
and so on), the FSC simply referred the issue of
inheritance back to the legislature for amendment. 
Conclusion and implications 
Until 1980, Martin Lau notes that ‘the locus for any
introduction of Islamic law [in Pakistan] was
parliament’, but thereafter, he insists that the FSC
became ‘a … mechanism to Islamize the [law]
independently’.24 ‘In the absence of political
leadership or societal consensus’, Charles Kennedy
writes, ‘the real determinant … of Islamic reform has
been the … courts themselves’.25 ‘It was well
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established’, Lau adds, that Islamic law imposed
certain limits ‘on the legislative power of …
government’.26
Given the lack of any clear social consensus
regarding the specific terms of Islamic law, such
claims are broadly understandable. But, as a
constitutional matter, they are also vastly overstated.
With respect to the Constitution, I would argue, the
locus of power has not come to rest on the executive
or the judiciary. With reference to the substantive
parameters of Islamic law, power has always been
vested in parliament. 
As Dieter Conrad points out, Pakistan’s first
Constituent Assembly took a crucial decision
regarding ‘the power of interpretation’ in matters of
Islamic law. ‘The power to … bring all legislation into
accord with “the injunctions of Islam”’, he explains,
‘was vested in parliament as the final interpreting
authority’. ‘The general disposition’, he notes, was ‘to
treat Islamic principles as a matter [for] the future’
and, then, ‘to entrust their realization to the …
political responsibility of the legislature’.27
Democratic constitutionalism, in this view, is not
defeated by the terms of religious establishment.
Nor is shari‘ah defeated by an appreciation for
doctrinal non-establishment. On the contrary,
following in the footsteps of early-twentieth-century
Muslim philosophers like Mohammad Iqbal,
democracy is broadly tied to a combination of
constitutional law and religion filtered through an
elected parliament and, therein, a politics of Muslim
‘becoming’. 
The compatibility of Islam and democracy is closely
tied to constitutional issues pertaining to the
separation of powers. In Pakistan, the ‘sovereignty’ of
Allah has been ‘delegated’ to elected representatives
so that, in due course, via those representatives, the
people of Pakistan shall be enabled to order their
lives ‘in accordance with Islam’. This is not (yet) a
common formulation in the realm of Muslim
constitutional law. But, for those with an interest in
the relationship between Islam and democracy —
not only in Pakistan, but elsewhere — I believe this
formulation deserves a closer look.
With respect to parliamentary practice and the role
of religious vigilantes, Pakistan cannot be described
as a model for other parts of the Muslim world.
However, Pakistani constitutional debates are often
quite nuanced and sophisticated. And, with respect
to the relationship between Islamic law and
parliamentary power, the value of a certain
familiarity with the experience of constitutionalism
in Pakistan—both its stability and its flexibility—
should not be overlooked. It is likely that other parts
of the Muslim world will revisit many of the debates
that Pakistan has already begun to examine.
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25 Kennedy (1992), 787. For one case that appeared to challenge a general deference to legislative authority, see Federation of Pakistan v. Gul Hasan
Khan (PLD 1989 SC 633), which prompted a new Qisas and Diyat Ordinance in 1995 — a rare case in which the shariat courts actually seemed
to articulate what the terms of Islamic law should be.
26 Lau (2000), 66.
27 Conrad (1949), 133, 134, 135.
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